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Iceland´s experience of rapid post-war inflation developments prompted a unique experiment
with a near-comprehensive financial indexation that may be worthy of consideration for a num-
ber of individual countries as well as for international capital markets. The indexation policy
came to its full fruition with such an articulated system as from 1979, while credit terms were
still administered in detail by the Central Bank. The following period thus became ripe with
experiences of running such a system and reaping its benefits. The problem of measurement of
inflation was solved by a composite, weighted index of consumer and construction prices, and
later to include wages, while finally the preference was for consumer prices alone. This simpli-
fication minimized the problem of time lag from measurement to application that had proved
considerable under accelerating inflation into higher doule digits. Prior to indexation the stock
of financial savings had seriously deteriorated in real and relative terms, mainly due to accumu-
lated effects of negative real interest. With indexation, followed within a few years by free inter-
est formation, the tide was turned over to rapid accumulation of financial capital that soon
brought about internal demand equilibrium and restored the role of interest and demand policies
in general, as well as greatly improving the external debt position. Bond issues rose to promi-
nence pari passu with indexation with resulting multiplication of market instruments which
developed further through share issues and stock exchange operations. The overall achievement
has been one of a highly modernized financial system. While thus aiming at protecting the finan-
cial system against the ravages of inflation, no illusions were held as to indexation leading to an
easy solution of inflation itself. However, it has obviously eliminated the inflation gains of the
public at large, and thus stamped out the inflation mentality and substantially eased the task of
disinflation.
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Over the post-war period of half a century Iceland has had a unique experience of relatively
high and variable inflation and of almost all sorts of measures to combat or live with inflation.
For most of this period more or less extensive measures to adjust financial values for inflation
have been resorted to, and over the last two decades these have taken the form of an elaborate
and near comprehensive system of financial indexation. From this follows that Iceland´s expe-
rience of financial indexation is no less unique than that of inflation itself. This has occasion-
ally been reported on an international forum, though mainly in its formative stages. Hence, a
clear and concise overview of this system, through to its effects and achievements, is consid-
ered worthwhile to present to international readers.
For this purpose, mainly a descriptive and historical study is called for, without ambition
or pretense of any generalized, theoretical conclusions but with recognition of lessons of expe-
rience that speak clearly for themselves. Logical presentation, however, requires a brief
expression of economic fundamentals and legal premises basic to the design of the indexation
system as well as a description of factual economic conditions for embarking upon it. These
are dealt with in the following three chapters.
Further three chapters are devoted to the approaches and experiments through which ideas
of technical design were tested, for later to be combined into a coherent whole. An integral
part thereof was to devise the regulating credit terms index, the developments of which are
described and evaluated in a separate chapter. With the advent of liberalized interest rates in
mid-eighties, forms and norms proliferated, leading to complicated relations of terms to
deposit duration and to options of switching between indexed and other terms. The conse-
quences of these in terms of balance and risk, and the reactions of the authorities to them, are
dealt with in the last of these chapters.
The following five chapters present a statistical description and evaluation of the credit sys-
tem under increasing application of indexation, formal as well as by principle of interest rate
formation. Quantitative developments are traced to the end of 1996, following the original,
domestic purpose study, as by then all the important lessons of experience had been reaped.
The first of these chapters set out the basic factors of the coverage of formal indexation and
the resultant developments of real interest rates. By means of that, the effects of real interest
rates can be evaluated as exerting a decisive influence on the preservation and formation of
financial capital. The last two of these quantitative chapters show the most important conclu-
sions in terms of real volume of financial savings as well as their relationships with gross
domestic product. 
Although this is a study of factual experiences in economic terms, not of the political issues
involved, some reference to policy aspect in a wider socio-economic context is not easily
avoided and, therefore touched briefly upon in the third last chapter. That is followed up by
some suggestions as to possible parallels for countries in a similar situation and for the inter-
national financial forum in general. Some of the last chapters contain various hints at conclu-
sions, leaving them to be stated in only the most condensed form in the customary conclusions
chapter.2
Economic fundamentals
For centuries and even millennia price waves have hit the at any time more developed and
active world. Rarely have these waves been neutral or general inflation in the sense of imping-
ing almost evenly on all categories of prices: product, input, raw material, factor and asset
prices. Alternatively, price relationships have changed in a manner sensed as deterioration in
the form of high prices relative to income of important segments of society, the term dearth
(in the early meaning, or in Icelandic dýrtíth - literally time of dear or high prices), being
appropriate, the classical harvest or natural yield fluctuations being a case in point. General
and neutral inflation is only to be expected when generated by pure monetary expansion, pos-
sibly in conjunction with aggregative income unit determination in the fashion of the
Keynesian wage unit. Otherwise we are faced with an abstract average measure not necessar-
ily experienced by many individuals in particular. In the modern age, however, the overall
monetary and income and price forming forces have become so overwhelming relative to the
natural, specific and divisive forces, that public consensus prevails of controlling the general
level of prices, in the conviction of not thereby distorting real economic relationships. 
What would constitute an appropriate measure of the general price level has, however, not
always been as apparent, at least not until the basic concepts of economics had been clarified
and ordered within a coherent system. In the initial stages prices in markets of quite different
nature were thought of as constituting the overall price level: product prices at primary, inter-
mediary and final stages, along with wages and salaries and asset prises. This is mentioned
here as it has resounded in the history of financial indexation in Iceland. With the clarification
rendered by modern analysis and, in particular, the national accounts system, a clear distinc-
tion within the system of economic flows is drawn between final product prices, commodities
and other inputs and factor prices, with asset prices as a class apart. Price indices of final prod-
ucts, goods and services, have a direct bearing on choices between consumption or physical
investment and financial savings, based on the monetary unit, thus unequivocally qualifying
for financial indexation. Input and factor prices, on the other hand, are one step removed, hav-
ing still to be impacted by productivity and market forces before entering the scene of value
judgments inherent in allocative decisions. Asset prices, real as well as on paper, although
being a factor of collateral value against loans, are ruled out as a normal price measure due to
their fluctuating nature in response to short term monetary management and changing market
sentiment.
The choice of a realistic measure of the general price level is on the one hand a valid
answer to the question of what should be the goal of price stability and the corresponding one
of which measure to select for financial indexation. Theoretical economists have nontheless
had reason to ponder over the choice between indexing to the price or the wage level. The rea-
son for this is the one given above that it is not self-evident to target prices when natural
shocks, e.g. failure of harvest or catch, cause a rise in prices at given wages. Wages would then
have to be forced down to achieve price stability, an exceptional process in modern times.
Conversely, rising productivity normally creates conditions for greater increase in wages than
prices. The other optional goal of wage stability would thus normally call for a falling price
level in face of potential inertia to that end, and wage and salary earners would have to be re-
conciled to the prospect of enjoying the productivity increase in the form of general price3
reductions instead of specific income increases, which goes against the grain of organized
labour. A compromise could be worked out by targeting a stability measure of the wage and
salary level following the trend path or moving average of productivity. This would raise all
sorts of complications, conceptual, technical and psychological and has not knowingly gained
any backing. 
Types of inflationary distortions are of two basically different natures. That of eroding the
stock of price information, necessary for planning and decision making is a costly nuisance
rather than causing similar harm and havoc as involved in massive depreciation of financial
capital being "burnt up" in inflation. The initial real inflation transfer from creditor to debtor
is harmful enough in itself, but is also liable to put an end to granting loans on corresponding
terms. Sources of finance for real investment hence dry up, strangulating economic growth.
When, however, the interest rate is changeable to the extent of compensating for inflation and
paid upon accrual, the real schedule of amortizations becomes distorted with the result of
much higher real downpayments in the former part and lower in the latter part of maturity,
with an unforeseen and possibly unbearable burden on the respective business. Coping with
this by repeated refinancing can appear untrustworthy and prove costly and problematic. 
Fundamentally, the choice is always between two ways to solve this issue: by preventive
measures against inflation or by corrective action to eliminate distortions, that is by financial
indexation, the former being of an ex ante nature, the latter ex post. The desired degree of price
stability is a simpler and more tension free and thereby a more desirable solution, if as secure
and not requiring sacrifice of other goals. There is no suggesting that prevention can be entire-
ly avoided and traded for indexation, while serious doubts can be raised as to the possibility
of eliminating inflation to a stable bottom level that would leave negligible problems, in its
height or variation, for the operation of credit systems. Experience of advanced market
economies lends little support to the idea of eliminating inflation without suffering, although
no clear cut trade-off between inflation and unemployment with relative stagnation is thereby
implied. What would be considered a costly level and variation of uncompensated inflation
has not been adequately discussed. A very low and stable level of inflation can be compen-
sated through nominal interest without appreciable distortion of amortization schedules on
medium term loans and thereby liquidity. Unforeseen swings in inflation present a more seri-
ous prospect of actual loss and can thus occasion contractual linkage to current market inter-
est rates. From informal observation of world financial markets a suggestion may be ventured
that for the level of inflation not to be considered uncomfortable it must not exceed 1.5 per
cent, and its variability should be limited to the range of 0.5-1 per cent, at annual rates.
Otherwise, losses can amount to appreciable proportions of low current real interest rates, so
that indexation or other security arrangements would be called for. Any assessment of this
kind is naturally dependent on specific inflation experiences and nature of markets but, even
in the present environment, indexation of long bonds is argued for and practised, mainly on
government bonds mostly intended for pension funds and other retirement purposes. This
seems to imply that any increase in inflation over present levels would occasion spreading of
indextion down the time scale of maturities. For a society with widespread financial indexa-
tion and much higher inflation in fresh memory, this arrangement allows of lower real inter-
est rates and constitutes a safety valve not to be lightly dismissed.4
Economic developments of past decades in Iceland, as well as of several similarly situated
peripheral countries, present a different context and narrower options in this respect.
Explosionary experiences of World War II and its contractive aftermath sent reverberations
generated by continued social tensions through decades, with alternating excessive income
settlements and consequent devaluations, which were also occasioned by variable external for-
tunes. The obvious and simple solution of raising interest rates to take the wind of demand out
of the sails and still the waves of the wage struggle did not appear as practicable as among
more advanced market economies, as so high interest payments would have drained seriously
the financial resources of industries and created hardships. Furthermore, very high interest
rates, formally unconnected with inflation, would have given no promise of their reduction
pari passu with the income and price moderation called for. Formal indexation, for long prac-
tised with wage and salary rates, therefore gradually gained adherence and application within
the credit system and was enacted in 1979 as an almost comprehensive system of credit terms.
Such a comprehensive system of financial indexation can be regarded as a way of running
a national economy as if no inflation existed, with corresponding requirements of applying
real terms to accounting and income tax systems, which has been the case in Iceland but is
outside the scope of this discussion. The largest factor by far of uncertainty and risk, that of
inflation, is thereby removed from financial operations, granting opportunity for unprecedent-
ed perfection in real outcomes. A basic premise for this is that people at large are motivated
in actual decisions by real interest rates and yield unobscured by the veil of money, seeming-
ly a plausible assumption. Despite removal of the inflation factor, much enough remains by
way of real risk, connected with economic cycles, inadequate financing and mismanagement,
to occupy financial markets administering and spreading financial risk. Value guarantees and
real interest rates have been dealt with in general terms by some of the best minds in eco-
nomics, such as Marshall, Irving and Keynes, without much prescription for application being
given. 
Financial indexation is liable to give rise to opposition based on different views and inter-
ests. Where inflation has been endemic and debtors have grown accustomed to inflation gains
from loans, they naturally defend their entrenched position, contending that business is unable
to bear the burden of normal real interest rates. It must, however, be borne in one way or
another, so the question only remains of its technical form or expression and of a suitable
adjustment period for this cost to be put in its proper place. Opposition of a diametrically
opposite kind occurs where inflation was previously a menacing threat, such as Germany is a
clear example of. Then it is not considered defensible to acknowledge the existence of infla-
tion in any orderly way, as it should rather be combatted by full force. Should this economic
pshycology be well founded, yielding satisfactory results without much sacrifice, it carries
with itself a certain justification, while a well informed public opnion could possibly allow of
indexation where rationally applicable. In advanced financial markets some tacit antipathy can
probably be sensed, on the ground that indexation presents a competitive alternative to estab-
lished methods of the market to insure against and spread risk, more akin to betting and lot-
tery. There are, however, indications that some market agents specialize in indexation, thus
challenging others to participate. At any rate, justification is hard to find for doing away with
competition from this angle. In a well established indexation system opposition could be5
revived by the scent of prospective inflation gains for debtors, against which it is safer to keep
vigilant guard.
A special case of opposition is based on the unsophisticated notion that indexation of both
loans and wages is inextricately bound together by reasons of conformity and equity, so that
one of them should not be permitted or implemented without the other. This argument, though,
is hardly set forth any more, probably due to wage-earners obvious interest in accumulation
and preservation of their pension funds and also because both types of indexation are legally
permitted, although the labour market has wisely refrained from applying it, mindful of the
fact that wage indexation has not preserved the standard of living but accelerated inflation.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that wages and salaries are not comparable magnitudes
to financial capital with respect to indexation. Loans are to their full amount handed over to
the borrower in the expectation of receiving their full value back as they fall due after years
or decades as the case may be. During that period the lender has generally no opportunity to
renegotiate the credit terms in view of changed circumstances and has therefore a valid reason
to secure the value of repayment by any practicable means. Only by reclaiming full original
real value can he count interest on top of that as actual income, comparable with wages and
salaries that always qualify as income, indeed varying in real value as compared with earlier
times. Conversely, labour is not handed over in the form of a stock value but as a service
through the passing of time, and the time validity of its terms is limited collectively by the
length of contract and individually by the right to terminate employment. Remuneration of
labour is thus frequently renegotiated in view of changed conditions, on both the collective
and individual level. Furthermore, the overwhelming weight of labour´s share in overall cost
and demand makes it utterly impracticable to fix it for any length of time. The ideal of guar-
anteeing real wages was based on the notion that economic growth and real wage progession
were dynamic magnitudes in steady advance, without risk of backtracking. This ideal was not
sustainable in a cycle-prone economy and, with the added unconditional claim of full employ-
ment, it perpetuated inflation with a chronic risk of its acceleration. No such socially backed,
monopolistic pressure is, on the other hand, present in the credit market. As a corollary to this
logical distinction between wages and financial capital, indexation of the former has very lit-
tle chance of guaranteeing their real value, while that of the stock of finance has it to the full
extent.
Legal premises
Indexation and interest rates have been enacted and regulated by law, and a framework of
legally binding rules for them thereby created. At their enactment and interpretation for imple-
mentation, legal premises embodied in the constitution and judiciary theory and court practice
come to be considered side by side with economic fundamentals discussed above. Although
charging interest prevailed in the earliest civilizations, it is well known that economic and
market oriented views on interest rates have fared badly through later history in comparison
with religious and philosopical notions. The misguided Aristotelean teaching that money was
barren and could not generate yield in the same way as living nature came to be embodied in
doctrines of the Church, leading to a ban on interest rates and punishment for usury. Being
unable to see money interest rates as a mirror reflection of net natural yields, Aristoteles might6
though have found reason to accept price compensation to keep real value intact. Jews, being
under no inhibition against charging interest to others than their own kin, took over credit
operation through the middle ages, until Calvinist societies started to loosen these knots, lead-
ing to gradual liberation through other Protestant societies and later all the Christian or
Western world. 
In Iceland, as elsewhere, the Catholic church exerted its influence against charging of inter-
est that according to fashion of its time was called "lease of money" or "of dead money", the
term for money being the same as for livestock. Being far removed from centres of church
power, Icelanders could allow themselves a fair amount of circumvention. With the advent of
the tithe that primarily served the purposes of the church, a norm of natural yield as well as an
interest rate of 10 per cent of principal was instituted and came to be embodied in the law of
the Commonwealth (the Grágás or Grey Goose). The practices of leasing livestock or its
counterpart in "dead money" seems to have alternated freely, giving considerable scope for
circumvention when the church pressed harder for its principles towards the end of the 13th
century. However, the coercion in favour of this concrete form of leasing has undoubtedly
proved a harmful detriment to a possible development of a domestic credit system, leaving the
economy more dependent on external sources of finance than would have been the case. In the
later ages interest was permitted in law but the royal executive could dictate its maximum
which in March 1815 was set as 4 per cent. That was done along with other measures of set-
tling dislocations from the Napoleonic wars, and those included an interesting example of the
principle of indexation applied on a sliding scale between one fifth to unity to war time debt
of the preceding five years. These measures, applied to both Denmark and Iceland, followed
the example from Preussia and Saxony after the Seven Years War 1756-63 and thereafter from
the so-called Wienerpatent of Austria in 1811. Fittingly, the decree for Iceland was signed by
the king in Vienna while attending the congress famous for its dancing! 
From then on through the nineteenth century the trend was towards liberalization, by the
initiative of the reinstituted Althing (Parliament). As from 1855 the 4 per cent maximum was
only applied to mortgages on fixed assets, other interest rates being unregulated. The same
decree stipulated 1 per cent surcharge for overdue claims and softened the penalty for usury.
The first legislation on interest rates after the Constitution enacted in 1874 was passed in a lib-
eral vein in 1890. It legalised 4 per cent interest rate, if an unspecified interest rate was nego-
tiated, and raised the ceiling on mortgages to 6 per cent. From then on, however, the tide was
turning with the advent of domestic state-owned banking. World war I and the Great depres-
sion gave added impetus to economic interventionism, leading to a legal 8 per cent maximum
on all interest rates from 1933, irrespective of price developments. From 1952 the interest
charged by the National Bank (Landsbanki) was made a legal norm and, with the separation
of its central banking department from its commercial bank operations, all interest rates came
to be dictated by the former, subject to government approval. Although well intended to intro-
duce purposeful economic management, this move opened the way for opportunistic political
intervention, jeopardizing the stability and soundness of the credit system for three decades.
Thereby, the important distinction was blurred between the respective regimes of private
law, regulating dealings of persons in an objective manner, and public law, dictating adminis-
trative action in the public policy spheres (res publica). In contrast to highly developed mar-7
ket economies, this was a more natural sentiment in an outpost like Iceland, where banks and
credit funds grew out of the public domain, closely linked to public finance and largely state-
guaranteed, externally and even internally. The credit market developed along oligopolistic
lines, and liberalization of interest rates was under these circumstances widely interpreted as
handing one-sided power over to the banks. To rectify this situation, a change in public opini-
non as to judicial relationships was called for, going hand in hand with quick positive results
of financial liberalization. 
Publicly administered interest rates easily invited a dominating emphasis on the political-
ly expedient debtors´ protection. This principle was not only applied to the intermediary insti-
tutions with dominant market power but carried further to the general detriment of savers. In
an inflationary economy this partial objective was most easily served by nominalism, i.e. by
strict adherence to original nominal value of principal and without regard for inflation in the
determination of interest rates. Nominalism was a legally binding interpretation under this
regime of directives. Even when linking of loans to the exchange rate was not overtly banned,
such unauthorized contracts were invalidated by ex post legal action connected with devalua-
tions, whether or not foreign exchange had been lent. 
This ideology inevitably influenced the definition of usury as a punishable action. The
concept of usury as relating to indecently high interest rates is based on a moral notion, thus
defining punishable action. Considered in the context of economic reality, which can give rise
to widely varying market equilibrium rates, a certain high rate of interest cannot in itself con-
stitute usury in the punitive sense, the lender having also to undertake wilful action of sup-
pressing the choice of borrower, coercing him to borrow at obviously unreasonable terms,
even with the deceitful purpose of acquiring his property through sale under duress. In open
and free competition a reasonable norm of interest rates should result, and such coercive
action should only be possible under mono- or oligopolistic conditions. Higher than permitted
rates under such circumstances do not, however, require any action on behalf of lenders.
Although borrowers are then usually better off by borrowing at a higher rate rather than being
denied a loan, lenders became ipso jure guilty of usury by fulfilling such a demand at a rate
making it worthwhile to part with their funds rather than employing them to their own needs.
This, admittedly, should be regarded a breach of administrative law rather than a misdeed to
a private person. Thus, the capital shortage caused by official maladministration created the
guilt of those individuals trying to solve it - a kind of Say´s law of justice creating its own guilt
- whereas in reality the guilt should be on the hands of the authorities! From this paradox there
could be no escape until indexation and market clearing interest rates had worked their way.
Usury, however, due to difficulties of disintermediation, apparently never constituted a major
problem.
Through a costly process of trial and error the conclusion was reached that credit terms
must as a general rule be based on the mutually supporting principles of freedom and sancti-
ty of contract, the former being a precondition of a viable financial market equilibrium and the
latter a condition of maintaining indispensable confidence. The sanctity question was put to
the test three times in the course of the credit terms index by which financial indexation came
to be regulated. 8
Economic conditions for indexation
The principal economic conditions for financial indexation in Iceland may be counted as
follows: 1. High rate of inflation and far in exess of that of other advanced economies, 2.
Officially administered interest rates not allowing the credit market scope to adapt to inflation,
and 3. Consequent stagnation and relative depletion of the stock of financial savings leading
to eccessive accumulation of external debt. 
Inflationary developments started during the second world war, partly in line with slack
economic management elsewhere but mainly generated by external forces that national
authorities were unable to cope with. Large increases in fish export prices and labour demand
for defence projects pressed and bid up wages while military occupation authorities hindered
a logical appreciation of the króna. Through domestic industries and services this generated a
typical war time inflation in the interval of 24-29 per cent in 1940-43. The prospect of having
to cope with post-war international competition prompted serious efforts to contain it within
the interval of 2.1-7.6 per cent through 1944-49. Partly, however, inflation was suppressed and
latent rather than eliminated, the prevailing system of wage indexation being the chief reason
for the suppression. Unrealistic fixity of the rate of exchange was a time bomb that was dis-
charged in 1949-50, and an unyielding and militant position of trade unions perpetuated chain
reactions through wage settlements, further accentuated by wage indexation. Inflation aver-
aged 22.4 per cent in 1950-52, largely inherited from previous years of the war and its after-
math. Economic contraction from external sources in the early fifties gave priority to inflation
combatting, to the average of 3.7 per cent in 1953-61, admittedly with some accumulation in
the lagoon of latent inflation. 
By hindsight it may be asked whether the long term prospect for inflation may have been
decided in the sixties. Instead of pressing inflation down to one digit points, with some toler-
ance of limited unemployment, a policy of conciliation with claimant unions opened the way
for incomes policy settlements that proved costly in terms of missing opportunities for con-
taining inflation through demand management. Fateful in particular proved later the lifting in
1965 of a previous ban on wage indexation with the negative justification that basic increas-
es could be as serious a threat. Over the period 1962-72 the average of a very uneven year on
year inflation was 12 per cent, peaking at 21.7 per cent in 1969 after a major devaluation, and
next to that 19.5 per cent in 1964 after a basic wage explosion of previous year. After the end
of the long period of the so-called "restoration" government, all brakes on collective bargain-
ing seemed to be broken, resulting in average 46.5 per cent inflation over 1973-83, lowest 31
per cent in 1976-77 but highest on annual basis 84.3 per cent 1983. Shorter periods could yield
still higher increases per annum.
In these decades the conclusion came to be reached that sufficient price stability to safe-
guard the stock of savings was not attainable, instead full price compensation of financial cap-
ital would have to be charged at whatever cost to debtors. Gradualism in combatting inflation
had proved a deep-rooted weakness, so accustomed as wage earners and debtors had become
to the indirect subsidy implied therein. A definitive solution had thus been so delayed as
always giving the disruptive forces opportunity for renewed initiative. The shift of opinion in
favour of financial indexation implied the view of inflation as a bad habit to be disposed of
swiftly, for an adaptation to be forced through the income distribution mechanism while the9
going was good. There were no illusions that adaptation would be free of pain and strife, nor
that indexation would automatically bring about disinflation, although suggestions were made
that it would eliminate the gains for active agents of causing inflation. But solid foundations
would be laid for demand management, holding out prospects for improved living standards
in the long run from enhanced economic discipline and more effective competition. 
After limited experiments from the mid-fifties, these general conclusions were expressed
in a cautious legislation in 1966, authorizing the Central Bank to permit financial indexation
upon application. Hazardous economic developments and political upheavals of the following
decade factually invalidated this law, postponing the matter for a fresh initiative by law from
April 1979, to be implemented when inflation was about to reach its climax. At that juncture
it proved a decisive force in compelling politicians to take determined action against inflation,
mainly in 1983 by doing again away with the vicious circle of wage indexation. Thereby,
inflation fell to 29 per cent in 1984 and crept gradually downwards to a single digit in 1991
and to around 2 per cent over the last few years, or to a commensurate level with the devel-
oped world. The impossibility, due to financial indexation, of negotiating away from the real
burden of debt, thereby augmenting consumption, was an important condition for this achieve-
ment. Another factor was the secure outcome in terms of real interest rates, rendering its lim-
itation easier to deliver to labour and making its effect for economic balance more predictable,
whether as a threat or promise.
Official intervention in credit terms is another main factor in the distortions caused by
inflation, as it prevents the market reactions which would otherwise tend to equilibrium.
Implied in such an equilibrium is not only the compensating level of nominal interest rates but
also such form of credit terms that maintains the real schedule of amortizations and thereby
the average life of loan contracts that would be seriously distorted by double digit inflation. It
remains puzzling how little has been heard of formal value linking of financial objects in his-
torical cases of very high inflation. This may be due to late development of reliable price
indices but probably also to ingrained reluctance of market participants to rely on such sophis-
ticated abstractions. 
History abounds with prejudice against charging of interest, always on moral grounds of
some sort, in antiquity and middle ages taking the form of religious and philosophical reason-
ing but in the modern era based on social equity considerations, relating to income distribu-
tion and creation and sharing of employment opportunities. These views either reflect domi-
nant economic thinking of their times, or are expressed in and justified by fashionable eco-
nomic theory. When liberal economic reasoning had largely done away with previous preju-
dices, Keynesian theory spread the in this context irrelevant consolation of the savings/invest-
ment identity, implying that authorities would be free to dictate the level of interest rates
according to the needs for expansion and employment. Leaving aside the possible justification
for this under depressed conditions in a large and relatively closed economic area, this proved
a highly misleading guidance in a very small economy lacking external scope for expansion.
Such a policy might have worked with strict adherence to testing by free market forces but,
when implemented at the behest of authorities, it invited arbitrary political decisions, dictated
by ill-informed popularity. A growing financial market imbalance ensued, calling for rationing
of credit with inevitable arbitrary political and regional favours and misallocation of capital.10
Of these phenomena there exist little if any statistical data but abundant anecdotal evi-
dence. 
Iceland possesses the particular characteristics of being a very small economy and very
open to natural and export market fluctuations, as well as being a closely knit society with
contagious sentiment. Governments have thus often been squeezed in a pincer between ongo-
ing inflation and a supply shock. Being under close scrutiny from social forces demanding
equity, the wielding of discretionary power has proved very difficult, leading to strong temp-
tation to take the line of least resistance. Almost invariably, this consisted of giving up the
claim of full value repayment of debt, which resulted from passively hiding behind the prin-
ciple of nominalism and partly implied the giving away of public funds. This kind of sacrifice
did not, however, last long or produce much result by way of stability, as it came to be taken
for granted and did not prevent new initiatives of claimant interest groups. It gradually dawned
upon the political leadership that the only way to cope with such situations would be to let
impersonal market forces have its role to play and abstain from discretionary action, other than
through operations in the market.
The authorities were responsible for all interest rates decisions until 1984, not only the gen-
eral level through some key rates but for the whole spectrum of rates, dictating the form and
manner of competition to serve customers and, naturally this called for restrictions on open-
ing up new branches. Although the Central Bank endeavoured to co-operate to initiate new
forms, mainly along with emerging indexation, that could not be a substitute for freedom of
action within a competitive environment. The depressing results in term of real interest rates
are clearly illustrated in figure 8, showing negative rates of total domestic credit in most years
until 1983, often in the interval of 10-20 per cent, except in years of special price stops. A def-
inite improvement occurred from 1979 with the legalization of general indexation, but only
with partial liberalization of interest rates in 1984 and its completion in 1986 were positive
real interest rates securely based. Until then, different subsectors of the domestic credit sys-
tem varied greatly in this respect. Marketable bonds consistently carried rather high positive
interest rates from their inception in 1964 and investment loan funds led the way of indexa-
tion among credit institutions to the extent that real interest rates were not appreciably nega-
tive from 1981. Current operational lending of the banking system, a natural domain of con-
ventional interest rates rather than indexation, was on the other hand treated as a matter of dis-
cretion, delaying stable positive results until the liberalization of 1984-86.
Stagnation and decline of the financial stock came to be the final and most definitive rea-
son for general financial indexation. The depletion caused by inflation occurred on a massive
scale, amounting in the period 1972-83 to an annual sacrifice in the interval of 4-10 per cent
of contemporary GDP, totalling about half of it, or 243 billion krónur measured by the yard-
stick ofthe 1996 GDP. This required fresh savings to fill in the financial gap instead of allow-
ing of a net increase and, with adequte incentives for voluntary savings lacking, this was to a
large degree accomplished by earmarked fiscal revenue and compulsory personal savings.
Accounting for that, however, the stock of financial savings declined by 23 billion krónur at
1996 prices between 1972 and 1975, or by 15 per cent, and did not recompense for that until
1979. A greater part of that decline occurred in bank savings, until then carrying a much
greater weight than later, depressing it below previous levels until 1981. Other financial sub-11
sectors both enjoyed more institutional savings and employed indexation earlier. The financ-
ing of such savings burdened several industries with final incidence on consumers, giving rise
to the policy of gradually abolishing it along with the restoration of voluntary savings. 
The constant price real measure quoted above is, however, not a satisfactory yardstick for
a growing economy, so the current ratio to GDP has been resorted to. By that measure, an
appalling decline in the relative value of the stock of financial savings occurred over the sev-
enties, with a stagnation from previous levels well into the nineties. Most dramatic was the
outcome of bank savings, deposits and notes, that tumbled from near 40 per cent of GDP in
1971 to roughly 20 per cent in 1980, or relatively by almost a half, and reached the former
level only with bank issued market bonds included towards the end of the period. Other insti-
tutional savings than those of pension funds declined by a similar ratio. Total stock of finan-
cial savings rose previously to a peak of 72 per cent of GDP in 1969, from then to fall by 27
per cent or 3/8 parts to only 45 per cent of GDP. 
These adverse developments were regarded as unsustainable and intolerable and were to a
large extent reflected in debt accumulation abroad. The net external debt position had been
limited to some 10 per cent of GDP in the mid-sixties, and to some 20 per cent at the onset of
seventies, after domestic prices had adjusted to recent large devaluations. From then on the
debt position increased in big jumps, related to major devaluations, without receding much
between them, so the long term trend was for a substantial increase to above 50 per cent of
GDP in the mid-nineties and, after some respite, again around 1993. In terms of real volume
at constant external prices, a steady increase appears from 1970 to 1992 with some slowdown
from 1990. As from 1993 the relative net debt position has declined by some 10 per cent but
the volume measure somewhat less. The unfortunate developments of financial savings and
external debt proved sufficient to call forth the legislation in the spring of 1979 for a compre-
hensive system of financial indexation, followed later by liberalization of interest rate deter-
mination in a free and competitive market.
Approaches, experiments and technical design
Before a fully articulated financial indexation was put in place, a public debate about such
a procedure had been going on for at least a quarter of century, and committees had been set
down to elaborate on the conditions for finacial savings, of which they had given their opin-
ions. The first actual experiment with indexation was conducted in 1955 in the housing sector,
where a need for balance between rights and responsibilities was most apparent, and devel-
oped over more than a decade to be later drastically limited by legislation. Full and unin-
terupted indexation started with savings certificate issues of the Treasury from 1964. The
momentum thereby gained was employed to pass a general legislation of financial indexation
in 1966, but this did not enjoy favour with the dedosit banks and was so cautiously phrased
that the external shocks soon to emerge prevented its implementation. The next steps were
taken from 1972 in bonds sold by investment loan funds to occupational pension funds, so
urgently requiring hedging against inflation.
These moves put the deposit banks in an unfavourable competitive position in view of ris-
ing inflation and tarnished their public image. To meet this challenge, they started in 1976 to
take special surplus interest rate deposits, with 6 per cent added to ordinary interest rates in12
the beginning, and linked to a permission to add a fraction of it to corresponding credit as well
as to all credit. This provided some incentive to hold deposits but did little to mark deposit
rates as a whole up to inflation. A generalization of this principle was attempted a year later
by a systematic inclusion of a price compensation factor into the interest rate decisions of the
Central Bank. This was not backed by any explicit political initiatives and, thus, met with
some inertia until the need for further steps became obvious. The ensuing deliberations then
gave impetus to the fully articulated and comprehensive financial indexation system enacted
in april 1979. In its beginning it was regulated by monetary authorities, thus lacking the flex-
ibility and adaptability following later with its becoming part of a market determined credit
terms system. With a partial interest rate liberalization from 1984 and almost a complete one
from 1986, the character of the indexation system changed from being an authoritative system
to becoming one of voluntary choice between credit terms favoured by the market. Its wide-
spread popularity has, of course, been based on its security in real terms, rendering premiums
for price risk unnecessary, while one of the main concerns of authorities has been the possi-
ble misbalance of indexation between the sides of credit institutions´ balance sheets. 
The legislation of this system in 1979 was backed by a unique technical design for com-
prehensive implementation, that by and large remained in force, despite variation of detail,
such as in the form and time limits of accounts, relating in particular to the changeable and
special terms deposits. For the principle of indexation to be applied also to the ordinary short
term deposits and credit of the banks, to the extent considered desirable, the choice was given
of two technical forms of indexation, further described below.
Formal linking to a price index is the conventional and simple method of indexation, suit-
able to middle or long term amortization loans. Then the amortization schedule is worked out
at the original value of the loan, or at its basic index level, whether by equal amortizations
with separate interest or annuity of payments including interest. In the case of changeable
interest rates through maturity, their amounts or a fresh annuity for its remainder must be
recalculated with each change of interest rates. Formal indexation does not affect the real con-
tent of those series but calls for all the magnitudes, relating to any particular date: amortiza-
tion, interest and residual principal to be inflated by a ratio, having the index in force at each
particular time as a numerator (multiplicator) and tbe base index as a denominator (divisor).
Such payments are usually made payable at the same date and, while it may be desireable that
this date is at the beginning of the month, or otherwise following upon a fresh index figure,
no bother is made of correcting for the rise missed within each month. The reason is partly
that such discrepancies are likely to even out through the period of each loan and, at any rate,
to carry minimal overall weight. 
Nontheless, the exact time linkage of an index to a loan is bound to present a certain prob-
lem. As a rule the paradox is at hand that for a full certainty of a correct, numerical value of
an index to be obtained, the price change must have taken place, been measured and
announced, so the factual price level may have changed further still at the time of actual pay-
ment. If it is attempted to cope with this by estimating price developments to the very day of
payment, the risk remains of the factual index not coinciding with its forecast. At the starting
point in 1979 a special credit terms index was established, combining the two official price
indices, with the cost of living index weighing two thirds and the building cost index one third,13
thus giving the price reference a wide scope and a sensible weighting between consumption
and investment. An added motivation was that these indices could support one another, as each
was calculated at a quarterly interval at different months, so one month in three went without
a new index figure. In view of these circumstances, the Central Bank judged that a safer imple-
mentation would be attained by computing the credit terms index by known values only, when
these were at hand, with the added estimate of a one month´s rise in the one month out of
three, when that was not the case. This led to a constant average delay of 50 days from the
measurement of prices to their entering in force to determine the nominal value of formally
indexed deposits and loans, of which 30 days is the minimum one month delay from compu-
tation of a price index to its entering into force, as the case is at present. 
Indexation by a price compensation factor is a method designed to attain real stock value
and intended real interest rate on shorter loans and financial accounts, i.e. the ordinary func-
tions of deposit banks. In the case of amortization loans, the rule applies that the price com-
pensation factor is added to the principal that, thereuopon, is divided by the remaining number
of downpayments to arrive at the nominal value of each, and so forth at each accrual. Basic
interest rate then forms the other part of total interest rate, intended to be paid upon falling due.
The interest rate as a whole in conjunction with inflation in the respective period, determines
the economic result reflected in real interest rates, the distinction into these two factors having
significance only for payments and thus liquidity which, therefore, has not been decided with
great precision. The method, however, lends itself to match basic with real interest, thus getting
it paid out on accrual. For that the price compensation factor is to be adjusted exactly to the
evaluated inflation level, and intended real interest rates to be inflated by the same ratio to form
the basic rate. The sum of basic interest and compensation factor then coincides with the total
nominal interest producing the intended real interest payment. Instead of the simple multi-
plicative relationships of formal indexation here enters an additive split-up of total interest.
Inflating both principal and real interest to the price level at the date of payment gives the same
result as with formal indexation, the difference in execution being that the latter works with a
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The psychological difficulty, arising from money illusion, of gaining public acceptance of
full indexation under high inflation is aptly illustrated by a numerical example of a 10 years
loan with 6 per cent real interest rate under 40 per cent inflation, leading to 8.4 per cent basic
interest rate when that form applies. In this example the nominal value of principal keeps ris-
ing up to the 7th payment and is then more than three times its original amount, and even the
amortization is then higher than the original principal. First with the 8th payment does the
principal start falling, and the 9th does of necessity half it and the 10th end it. Interest to be
paid only declines after the principal has done so, with the 9th payment, while amortization
and total annuity rise throughout, the latter to a threefold original principal. Even with
incomes rising as much or more than prices, this could be difficult to understand and accept.
A fall in real incomes, on the other hand, could conceivably occasion real interest rate decline.
The advantage of indexation by way of an even payments burden until maturity is illus-
trated in figure 1, showing real amortizations of a 10 years loan in 10, 20 or 40 per cent infla-
tion. Interest is left out as it adds nothing in principle, the real duration of a loan being
expressed through its principal. A fully indexed loan by either method forms the basic sce-
nario, generating constant real terms amortizations. In the other three cases inflation is com-
pensated by correspondingly higher interest paid on accrual, without any part of it being added
to the principal. By that principle real amortizations are very high in the beginning, varying
with inflation and falling through the middle to become very low towards the end. This
implies that the original lending for a term of 10 years is largely invalidated by the method of
interest payments. These distorted amortization schedules intersect with the original one
between the 4th to after the 5th payment. At mid-term, after the 5th payment, 69 per cent of
real principal have been repaid under 10 per cent inflation, 80 per cent under 20 per cent, and
91 per cent under 40 per cent inflation. Only in the lowest case some semblance of the origi-
nal duration of loan is retained, and there is some experience to suggest that inflation up to
that level is tolerated for a considerable time without indexation being attempted, despite quite
a bother with refinancing. The higher two cases obviously represent an invalidation of a loan
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The determination of interest rates containing price compensation with reference to current
inflation naturally called for an evaluation of the inflation level at each particular time. That
gives rise to questions about the relevance of past as well as prospective inflation, already dis-
cussed, as well as about the time span back and forth to be taken into account. As a matter of
fact, the interest rate is as a rule determined for some time to come, to be reviewed on any
upcoming occasion, over a considerable period three dates of each month, the 1st, 11th and
21st, having been employed for those revisions. Inflation projections should accordingly be
the focus of such decisions. Public expectations, however, tend to be strongly influenced by
recent experiences, giving occasion to take these into account. A viable adjustment system of
this kind also calls for a evening out of sudden and large price fluctuations through gradual
accumulation of interest, instead of revaluation according to the index at a point of time. This
kind of problem mainly prevailed in the period of rare but big devaluations, and then the oli-
gopolistic preconditions for such ex post corrections were present to a greater extent than in
the later era of free financial markets. The solution of this problem was approached through
application of the socalled Janus rule, carrying equal weights of past and prospective inflation
over a whole year at any time with, however, double weights on the more pertinent last and
next quarters, each evaluation thus being composed of six quarterly weights. Figure 2 shows
this composition of relative weights, along with the respective weights of the indices basic to
the credit terms index as it was composed to the end of 1988. By this rule and with reasonable
foresight but without a chronic one-sided error of forecasting, all the highs and lows of infla-
tion should be accumulated into the financial stock to an approximate equivalence with for-
mal indexation. 
This method of evaluating the inflation level was, however, an unlegalized operational rule
of the Central Bank, and some other compositions were also monitored, such as two quarters
or four months weighed together in the same way. With slower and more even inflation, the
emphasis gradually moved over to the shorter scales, and with the advent of free interest rate
formation the deposit banks gained independence from such Central Bank intervention but
grew more demanding of reliable inflation forecasts from its economic department. In the
wake of the so-called national conciliation income settlement at the beginning of 1990 a gen-
tlemans' agreement of interest rate moderation was couched in the terms of reference to infla-
tion one month back and two forwards, centering on the month for which each decision was
immediately valid. As matters have developed, no particular rule can be regarded as being in
force. Deposit banks as well as other market participants naturally review the inflation
prospects at any time, along with a host of other market conditions, also tending to even out
small short-lived and erratic fluctuations. 
Further measures were needed to link together, on the one hand, formally indexed credit
terms, implying revaluation at certain dates and, on the other, interest accruing on a day-to-
day basis. Deposits are entered on index-linked accounts at any date of month but, for reasons
of expediency, are formally indexed for whole months without regard for the exact date of
entry. Price compensation plus real interest is then lacking from the date of entry to the end of
that month and, correspondingly, from the beginning of the month of discharge to its date of
entry. For both of these subperiods a special rate of compensation within a month has been
applied, inclusive of real interest, and added to the balance to be indexed or paid out.16
More precisely defined the credit terms index, when composed of two or three indices, was
computed as a geometric average of its basic indices that, accordingly could be combined into
one formula without having to synchronize their bases. This formula was given the base value
of 100 by the application of a constant, that was altered upon any later rebasing of the basic
indices to link to its former value at the rebasing date, thus rendering a continuous index. The
development of the credit terms index, not least in comparison with other economic magni-
tudes and the fate of wage indexation, gave rise to political dissent, resulting in important
changes of design and composition. Also, the time lags inherent in the process had implica-
tions not readily perceived from the start. At the onset of indexation, inflation was very high
and accelerating over the coming four years. Upon entering into force with the base value 100
at the beginning of June 1979 the real time credit terms index had risen to 106.4, so the valid
index measured only 94 per cent of the actual level. The difference was bound to figure as a
price rise after that to be compensated in indexed loans. This would not be harmful under a
constant rate of inflation, yielding a constant deviation due to time lag. In the event, however,
it accelerated strongly up to March 1983, yielding insufficient indexation until then and dou-
bling the lag deviation to around 12 per cent in March-April. Sudden disinflation from then on
led to an overly strong indexation for a while, but since the autumn of 1983 the deviation lag
has been insignificant and receding, most often between 1 and 2 per cent and almost nil at the
end of the period under study. 
Developments of the credit terms index 
It did not last long before changes in the basic design of the CTI were occasioned by a gener-
al feeling of a heavy debt burden under the supply shocks of the early eighties, possibly influenced
by the extra weight caused by the time lag, but more specifically by the need to speed up the
impact of disinflation and later to take explicit account of the changing fortunes of labour. As part
of the disinflation undertaken in the summer of 1983 it was decided to speed up or "juvenate" the
index and reduce the time lag to the practicable minimum of a month, coinciding with monthly
computation of the basic indices from the Statistical Bureau. This implied dropping two thirds of
a month out of their continuity, taking a new price rise into account instead. This was done by
apllying the old formula up to September 1983 and the new one from then on, which in the view
of the professional reference committee instituted by the law would yield a similar result to the
end of the year as by the old formula. This measure met with general accord, as the new formula
led to a more timely computation of the CTI.
Initiatives were also taken to soften the impact of the disinflation measures on real earnings by
diluting the CTI base with inclusion of a wage index, and proposals abounded of turning the
weights round or issuing a special index with such a composition for housing loans. Legal prohi-
bition of wage and salary indexation from that time also, by analogy, posed a serious danger to the
very existence of financial indexation. In the event, the rising vested interest and economic power
of the pension funds probably proved decisive in staving off this threat and avoiding the confu-
sion of operating with two distinct indices in the growing bond market. Instead, a special wage
index for equalization of loan payments was instituted in June 1985, granting households the right
of systematic delays of payment, when the CTI rose faster than a combined index of wage rates
and earnings. At that time, a boom was already rising, rendering this measure less urgent.17
The next recession starting in 1988, naturally, did not fail to arouse the same reaction in
favour of a wage factor in the index. An expert committee was set up in the middle of 1988 to
make proposals for preventing misalignment between incomes and credit terms. Its delibera-
tions centered around the feasibility of legalizing changed composition of the CTI, despite the
widely held conviction that sanctity of contract would prevent that as far as former commit-
ments would be concerned. The committee, however, opinioned that no such yardstick could
be guarateed for all times in face of changing social conditions, so the legislature could make
such a change enforcable.The reference committee, already cited, declared such an index to
become a new one, unsuitable to be directly linked with the former index. The Central Bank´s
economic department concluded that such a threefold index might show similar results as the
former in the long run and would have more benign fluctuations for households. Weighing
these considerations together, the government decided to implement this change by issuing a
regulation according to the law, effective as from January 1989. This change called for the
enactment of a new index of the general level of wage and salary earnings per hour of work,
but without direct effects of variable labour time, or of share allotment or similar factors.
Against this new design of the CTI, it was argued i.a. that, including the direct measurement
of labour cost in the former base indices, it brought its total weight up to 49 per cent, and even
up to 59 per cent including the most direct causal relationships.
With economic recovery from 1994, as well as partly from reasons of self interested oppor-
tunism, the argument gained new force that financial indexation should take account only of
final product prices, but not of factors of production. It was foreseen that earnings would rise
faster than prices in the near future, and this the trade unions saw through a magnifying glass
and contended that through debts of households it would unduely dent the income gains to be
made and impede collective bargaining. Needless to say that much of these arguments con-
fused one-time asset effects with recurrent income effects, or omitted the greater interest of
households on the side of financial assets than debts. The added reason for simplification was,
however, also advanced that the indexed papers were not faring well on external markets,
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Figure 3 Credit Terms Index compared
with its component indices
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being complicated and badly understood and with greater perceived risk of being changed than
a singular index. The only index fully qualifying for this need was the cost-of-living index.
New legislation in March 1995 changed its name to the consumer price index, whereupon it
was by inclusion into an act on interest rates given the validity of credit terms index and
linked to the old one for obligations from the past. With this arrangement, the responsibility
of issuing this regulating index was handed over to the Statistical Bureau which in itself is
desirable, as it carries no responsibilities for economic policy or administration. Despite some
earlier experience of officially dictated changes in the credit terms index, this well founded
last move, supported by the atmosphere of a freely functioning financial market, gives reason
for hope of it being the final intervention of its kind. 
Comparison of the credit terms index through time with either its basic indices or with
income indices is problematic because of the effects of time lags of the CTI. The comparison
of factual developments of prices and wages with with the CTI valid at any time seems, how-
ever, meaningful enough to consider. This is shown with the basic indices and incomes in fig-
ures 3 and 4. The basic indices first took turns at leading, but from 1983 building costs lagged,
mainly due to the direct labour content, measured by wage rates, as well as probably to the
customary lag of devaluations after domestic costs and prices. This gap fluctuates with the
economic cycle, peaks in 1988 but narrows from then on, although concealed by the arithmetic
scale of figue 3. From 1989 the valid CTI deviates downwards from that of the original for-
mula to the maximum of 6.8 per cent at the beginning of 1997. This, however, is roughly com-
parable to the time lag distortion from the start, thus outweighing it. Over the whole period
consumer prices coincide almost exactly with the original CTI, without dilution by wages,
supporting the claim to quality of the former. On that more rigorous measure, formal interest
rates could have been on average some half percentage point lower than the valid index
through the whole period for the same real result.
The comparison of figure 4 has a bearing on the socially oriented criticism levelled against
the CTI, drawn on the proportionally valid logarithmic or potential scale. Wage rates are low-
est throughout, being a measure of the collectively negotiated factor of income generation.
Figure 4
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Until 1986, earnings also lag somewhat after the CTI but outstrip it from then on. Disposable
income of all households, including the effects of taxation and social policy, on the other hand,
outpace it for all the period apart from 1983-84. The general overview of these developments
seems to invalidate the criticism that financial indexation has been unduly harsh on wage and
salary earners and households in general.
Time related and switching terms and indexation balance
Time is a key concept of both credit terms and inflation and, hence, at the core of the rea-
son and justification for financial indexation. Contractually binding time-span of credit com-
mitments has been of value, in the commercial as well as economic policy sense, long before
indexation, and from its onset was considered relevant to decisions on what to index.
Previous, small distinctions between sight and time deposits of various lengths of term
proved ineffective in face of mounting inflation losses, with the consequence that such lim-
its were taken less seriously and ever larger sums came to be untied, increasing the risk of
run on deposits. Bonds and longer term loans came to be given priority which gave the
investment loan funds generally free play to index their loans, while the deposit banks came
to be presented with a host of complications for prudential or political reasons. 
Despite legislation of comprehensive indexation from June 1979, the political authorities
showed reluctance of its implementation, imposed an adjustment period of a year and half for
the attainment of minimum targets for interest rates, and initially banned indexed deposits but
permitted indexed loans to a minimum of 4 years. A year later the ban on deposits was lift-
ed in favour of a minimum term of 2 years but without much results, so by legal intervention
in February 1981 the minimum was lowered to 6 months but without interest, placing an
unmistakable political stamp on that action, and the lending minimum was lowered to 2½
years. This move heralded a policy of liberating these terms, so that from April 1982 to July
1988 indexed deposits could be down to 3 months, while the credit minimum varied some-
what erratically between a year and half and 6 months. The tide of policy was then turning
again. The strong results from indexation, the approach to price stability and a more intense
competition in the wake of interest rate liberalization made the authorities more keenly aware
of perceived market rigidities caused by direct linking with indexed bond rates, as well as of
the possible risk associated with mismatch between indexed assets and liabilities. This
caused policy to turn again towards lengthening of indexed terms on both sides. For deposits
the minimum increased to 6 months from mid-1988, and to one year from mid-1993, and
finally to 3 years from the beginning of 1998. On the side of loans, or assets of banks, the
minimum was lengthened to 2 years from mid-1988 and to 3 years at beginning of 1991, to
revert again to 2 years at mid-1993 and 3 years from beginning of 1996, in the effort to
improve the match, and finally to 5 years at beginning of 1998. The policy has been declared
to raise that mark still to 7 years at the beginning of 2000 pari passu with not permitting
indexed deposits. Going so far seems to be in contrast with the generally liberal policy adopt-
ed, still more so as a commensurate degree of risk has hardly been aptly demonstrated. This
has, however, to be finally decided by the authorities then in charge. This measure implies
that deposit banks will have to finance indexed loans through bond issues as well as with
their own capital.20
A particular relationship of indexed to non-indexed terms occurred with the socalled
switching terms, causing certain deposits to switch from one type of terms to the other to give
depositors the higher of the two alternatives. As with most other anomalies in the market, the
occasion for this rose from misguided attempts at official control. In the inflation binge up to
1982-83 the banks suffered from adminitrative delay in raising interest rates and then tried to
make it up by delaying the lowering of interest rates in the coming disinflation. This led to a
large flow of deposits from indexed to unindexed terms, in the amount of 3.4 billion krónur in
eight months to end of April 1984. This led to a considerable mismatch, indexed loans being
some 15 per cent greater than indexed deposits, and to a corresponding deterioration of banks
profits. The disparity of instantaneous adjustments in the indexed section as against the polit-
ically accentuated lag in the nominal interest section came to have varied consequences.
Banks withdrew new indexed loans for some time and introduced switching terms to prevent
repeated flux of doposits, while the authorities from then on adopted a vigilant stance towards
mismatch of indexation. Essential features of these terms were nominal interest terms backed
by the guarantee of corresponding indexed terms over a reference period of 6, 3 or even 1
month, should that formula yield better terms to the depositors, while they retained net gains
on the other side. An accumulation of several periods were thus bound to be more costly to
the banks than a consequent outcome of either formula. This method, as well as the long ver-
sion of the Janus rule, implied the assumption that the banks could regain the balance by ex
post interest rates increases, which again implied oligipolistic market conditions. As a more
intense competition ensued, mainly as a result of the indexation and real interest rate policy, a
more acute concern of risk gave rise to the policy of minimizing it. 
At the beginning of 1989 the first step was taken of harmonizing the reference periods of
switching terms to the longest period of 6 months. A year later the rule was imposed that
indexation could only apply to deposits tied or unmoved over 6 months. Switching terms were
then limited to tied deposits, while through so-called special terms, indexation could apply to
the same duration of untied deposits. From the middle of 1993 these minimum periods were
lengthened in line with the rules already described, and from the beginning of 1995 untied
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deposits could not be indexed. While deposits tied for12 months, and 6 months successively
thereafter, were allowed to be indexed, as well as regular installments on long term savings,
the switching of terms was then discontinued and replaced by high unindexed rates linked to
a high termination charge to be relinquished after a suitable duration. 
These developments brought the issue of indexation mismatch and associated risk into
sharp focus and led to their close scrutiny by the bank inspectorate and monetary authorities.
This degree of awareness was partly occasioned by past conditions of high and jerky inflation,
and a more basic research of such risk under up-to-date conditions seems to be called for. It is
lessened by the fact of inflation being a principal consideration on either side. The risk, how-
ever, arises from this consideration being automatic under indexation but dependent on dis-
cretionary reaction under the nominal regime. The fundamental reason for monitoring an
indexation balance is that anything can happen and you cannot insure after the event. It is,
however, possible to generalize about likely losses or gains. Distinction is drawn between pos-
itive mismatch, when more assets are indexed than liabilities, and negative, when the opposite
is the case. These nomenclatures refer to risk of inflation rising from a relatively low to a high-
er level. In such a case the positive variant is liable to bring gains from instantaneous rise of
net indexed assets, set against lagged accumulation of interest on deposits, contrary to the
losses from a negative balance, when the instantaneous rise occurs on the liabilities side. All
this is turned upside down under the opposite developments of disinflation. Needless to say
that prudential concern has mainly been directed towards the risk of negative mismatch under
rising inflation. As a matter of fact, however, the mismatch of deposit banks was generally
positive during the phase of rising inflation up to 1983 but negative under lower and falling
inflation in the period 1988-93. Hence, it is difficult to pinpoint any particular losses from this
cause after the one in 1984 cited above. Figure 5 shows the total balance or mismatch of the
deposit banks at end of years 1980-95 as percentages both of own capital and total assets. In
terms of sheer proportions it does not seem substantial in more than three years on either side
but in both phases it is sensibly related to the direction of inflation, with the further consol-
ation that real interest rates have in the latter years been higher on unindexed than indexed
loans. The awareness of the mismatch first became acute with its increase on the negative side
in 1991 and the measures to deal with it mainly date from that and later years.
These measures fell into four categories: 1. Regulation of lengths of deposits and loans per-
mitted to be indexed, 2. Limitations on the practice of switching and special terms of deposits,
3. Rules about allowable mismatch for each institution, and 4. Indexation and interest rate
swaps between the Central Bank and the deposit banks. The first two have already been dealt
with. The third stipulated that as from the middle of 1993 each deposit bank should strive to
keep the mismatch within 20 per cent of its capital. In that endeavour this limit was overshot
on the positive side already next year which, however, was not regarded as a problem. The
fourth measure constituted a unique experiment with implementing the technique of swaps in
Central Bank deals in the market to further its policy. The swaps covered the period of
September 1993 to December 1994, taking departure from the initial mismatch of Krónur 24,5
billion, to be run down by 3.5 billion in each four month subperiod. For each of these the
Central Bank swapped (credited) a certain real interest for a (debit of) nominal interest corre-
sponding to the real interest rate and the Bank´s own inflation forecast for the coming four22
months. Thus, it not only indemnified the banks for the accepted mismatch but also took
responsibility in terms of cash for its own inflation forecast. The Central Bank gained from
lower than forecast inflation in the first period, lost in the next two, while in the fourth infla-
tion was exactly on the mark. Thereupon, both parties agreed that the reason for further swaps
or other measures against mismatch had evaporated. 
Coverage of formal indexation
Quantification of the coverage of financial indexation, and how it spred through the financial
markets from a slight beginning to overwhelming importance, is an important element in the
evaluation of its significance. For this, all the statistical data at the disposal of the Central Bank
have been marshalled, and a substantial amount of new information has been compiled in order
to form a coherent whole. Due to voluminous internal dealings between different sections of the
credit market, a great deal of double counting would ensue. To prevent that and secure a mean-
ingful aggregate to work with, the final credit from the credit system to the active sectors out-
side it, have been analysed into the three main categories of formally indexed, non-indexed or
nominal interest rate, and foreign exchange linked terms. Greatest significance is attached to the
distinction between indexed and nominal terms on domestic financial capital, as these determine
its growth conditions, while the exchange-linked terms apply mostly to foreign capital and are
externally determined, even to the extent of its re-lending to nationals. It should be borne in
mind, however, that after the legislation of 1979 became effective the bulk of nominal terms also
followed the guidelines of value guaranteeing through the price compensation factor of interest
rates.
The principal sections of the credit market to be dealt with are: 1. Marketable securities, 2.
Investment loan funds, 3. Banks and savings banks (deposit institutions), and 4. Pension funds
and insurance companies. Marketable securities were the first to form a continuous series and
reliable presence in the market, starting with government savings certificates in 1964 and issued
ever since. They were index-linked from the beginning, as experience had shown that only such
papers could be floated in the market, and carried high interest rates on top of that to avert any
risk of failure. Indexed Treasury lottery bonds were added in 1972, with unindexed interest rates.
An insignificant attempt was made at issuing exchange-rate linked bonds from 1984, based on
the SDR-unit, as well as an abortive attempt at unindexed Treasury bills, renewed in 1986 and
gaining safe footing only from 1989. With the addition in 1985-86 of bond issues of banks,
investment loan funds and leasing companies, the indexed bond market gained still more head-
way, forming a basis for operations of the new stock exchange. A substantial element was added
by indexed housing bonds in 1989, for financing individual house purchases, and further by
building fund bonds in 1992, for collective financing of the public housing funds. Finally, busi-
ness enterprises and municipalities started to issue marketable bonds in 1994. All this flora has
grown out of the original seed of marketable indexed bonds, these still amounting to some 86-
89 per cent of the total over a decade, while unindexed papers, mainly Treasury bills for cash
management have been in the 10-13 per cent interval, but exchange-linked bonds have remained
below 2 per cent. Despite the overwhelming weight of indexed bonds, an important development
has been the increased marketability and maturities of unindexed bonds which, according to
declared policy should rule the roost up to a maturity of 7 years from the year 2000.23
The investment loan funds have over this century been an important branch of the financial
sector. As public agencies, pooling the scant resources of a small emerging capital market,
they have played a similar role as private investment banks and real credit institutions in
developed market economies. Being largely administered by politically appointed interested
parties, not least representatives of debtors, they gradually showed the weaknesses to be
expected, mainly with the onset of inflation, failing to consolidate their financial position by
means at their disposal. These funds have now been mostly unified into an industrial invest-
ment bank, about to be privatized, and a publicly operated housing credit system. This chief
distinction has been maintained throughout, and the industrial side further organized along the
lines of industrial classification, with special funds still intact catering for regional and com-
munal purposes. 
The very first experiment with financial indexation in Iceland was made by one of the
housing loan funds, the State Building Fund, in 1955 in an attempt to promote savings for
housing purposes as well as to imbue the working population with financial responsibility to
reciprocate for the public efforts and outlays expended for that social purpose. This indexation
was only partial, starting with indexing one fifth of the loans but increased gradually up to a
half in the mid-sixties, then interwoven with the fashionable incomes policy. That policy actu-
ally also came to include provisions for a large share of growing pension funds to be chan-
neled to the housing loan funds. With further excesses of such a policy the law was enacted in
1972 that the sum of interest rates and price compensation on the principal must not exceed
7.75 per cent, at the very turning point to a greatly accelerated inflation. This measure all but
annulled previous indexation, measuring for some years around a half of the loan stock, so a
fresh start had to be made with 30 per cent indexation from 1974, rising stepwise to the full
amount from 1979. Thereby, the stock of indexed housing loans grew in percentages of the
total from 9 in 1974 to 40 in 1978, and then with fully indexed new loans to 75 in 1980 and
94 in 1982, culminating with 97-99 per cent over the period 1983-96. With the unindexed
stock having petered out, housing loans have been indexed to the full extent, the minor excep-
tion being temporary credit. 
Industrial and regional loan funds operated with some 55 per cent domestic unindexed
funds and 45 per cent foreign exchange-linked funds over a period prior to indexation, and it
even happened that funds took on the loss from devaluation, thus protecting the interests of
debtors. The dearth of voluntary savings due to increased inflation was partly met by ear-
marked indirect taxes, mainly from the respective industries, and direct fiscal grants, as well
as by government enforced lending of 10 per cent of deposits increse from banks, but also
increasingly from external borrowing, the stock of which in some years amounted to 60 per
cent. With initiatives from most of the funds sorely lacking, indexation made a very slow start
in the late sixties, only making headway with partial indexation when the centrally operating
Development Fund started to sell indexed bond to pension funds from 1972 and, further, when
legal compulsion to apply such terms was added in 1975 and backed by the government from
then on. By 1973 the indexed share of domestically financed loans was only 5.3 per cent,
incresing gradually to 28.5 per cent 1978 and jumping with the new law to 58 per cent in 1979,
to grow onwards to 97 per cent in 1988. Since then, with increased faith in the currency and
more varied operations of the funds, unindexed loans have regained some of their share to24
around 10 per cent over half a decade. As a part of the total both domestic categories increased
their share over the last few years, as the foreign share declined from 63 to 51 per cent between
1993 and 1996.
Investment loan funds as a whole, top section of figure 6, show the share of external capi-
tal much diluted from above, as housing credit does not employ any foreign funds. This is
accentuated still by the greatly increased weight of the housing subsector during the period,
from 22 per cent in 1964 to 72 in 1996. Over the first decade of the period the indexed share
of the total is almost exclusively the housing share diluted over the total, while, since 1974 the
industrial funds are following in the wake of housing funds, catching up in 1979 and treading
a similar path since then. In the earlier phase of indexation up to 1970 its share varied in the
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Figure 6 Credit terms analysis of the credit system25
interval of 13-29 per cent of domestic funds, falling to 4 per cent in the next years due to the
legal limitation cited above. From some 9 per cent in 1974, a gradual increase brought it to 34
per cent in 1978 and a jump to 59 in 1979, from which it developed into some 97 per cent over
the period 1985-96. These remain the approximate proportions despite minimal inflation over
the last few years as the funds wish to play safe on the basis of established technique, while
fuller experience with inflation control is being gained. Their sources of funds lying mainly in
the bond market which, thereby, must be expected to lead the way into the spread of unindexed
terms over the medium and perhaps to some extent into the long term maturities.
Banks and savings banks have been the least likely to adopt formal indexation as these
cater mainly for short and current account credit lines, constantly being reviewed without a
fixed amortization schedule. They had, however, the same reason as other branches to fend off
the inflation induced decline of loanable funds, while the technique to that end came largely
to be different, mainly that of the price compensation factor of formally nominal interest rates
already described. With more hectic inflationary developments, however, the banks felt urged
to compete also in formally indexed terms. The section on banks in figure 6 is based on that
formal distinction, notwithstanding that, with the regime from 1979 in full operation, all cred-
it has been value-guaranteed and all but the most liquid deposits. The numerical basis of that
section is all financial assets of banks from the indexed balance analysis cited above which are
almost identical with total credits. 
The real contraction of deposits, and still greater relative to GDP, started and grew increas-
ingly serious in the seventies. Hence, the conventional method of requiring deposits into the
Central Bank to channel to export industries and public sector financing became no longer
adequate, leading to growing external and exchange linked finance for the export industries,
up to some 40 per cent of bank credit in 1983-85. Increasing strength of the banking system
with indexation is shown by the halving of that external dependence till the end of period,
despite full outward liberalization being implemented. In the meantime, indexation made a
slow start due to time limitations already described and its development was jerky up to 1986
for the same reason as well as due to official intervention and changing advantage of indexed
relative to non-indexed terms. Indexed deposits (or financial liabilities, not shown in figure 6),
dependent on favour and faith of depositors, grew more steadily, to 31 per cent of krónur-
denominated debts in 1983, and to 61 per cent in 1988 and finally 64 in 1993, to fall again to
43 per cent at the end under the pressures of prudential control discussed above. Indexed
financial assets, mostly credits, on the other hand, backtracked on their growth path in 1984
and 1986 to 33.5 and 38.5 per cent of domestically financed credits but from 1987 reached a
level through fluctuations between 49 and 59 per cent without a clear trend. As percentages of
total financial assets, including the foreign component, this was an interval of 36-47 per cent. 
Pension funds and insurance companies more or less followed the example of either
investment loan funds or deposit banks, depending on form and length of loans and within per-
missible limits. These are of minor significance and reliable data are lacking, so separate esti-
mates are not shown but included in the credit system total.
Credit terms analysis of the credit system as a whole, including the two branches not shown
separately, is given in the bottom section of figure 6. The credit system is thought of as a con-
solidated whole of domestic and external lenders to the active domestic sectors outside it. By26
aggregation the trends appear more regular than those of the constituent parts, while breaks in
the sectional trends are modestly reflected. The larger fluctuations of external credit clearly
reflect the heaviest supply shocks to the economy, such as in 1967-69, 1974-76 and 1982-85.
These were aggravated by the lack of preparedness to cope with them and have left some
enduring mark on the debt position. The last adversities of 1989-93, however, hardly shine
through at all, most certainly thanks to the maturity and strength gained by the domestic cred-
it system, as well as to improved economic administration. 
The analysis of domestic credit is more regular with the cyclical swings of external credit
left out. The indexed component depicts the S-shaped curve familiar with trends from near nil
to a level of relative saturation. In the first and abortive phase it grew from less than 4 to
almost 10 per cent of domestic funds between 1964 and 1970, or from 3 to 7.5 per cent of total
credit, to drop again to below 5 or 4 per cent respectively in 1971. From then on the increase
was evenly gradual to almost one fifth of domestic credit or 12 per cent of total credit in 1978.
With the comprehensive legislation of 1979 it jumped by increasing steps to 74 per cent of
domestic credit or 55 per cent of the total in 1983. Since 1987 the indexed share has flutuat-
ed between 77 and 82 per cent of domestic credit or 50 and 58 per cent of total credit. The rel-
ative increase of the indexed share over the last three years is largely caused by the relative
decline of external debt.
Although this study is concerned with the outward boundaries of the credit market, in its
dealings with the active sectors or final users of financial services, a mention should be made
of indexation in the intermediary role that the Central Bank played over an extended period.
In Iceland central bank operations were given a wider scope than customary among developed
market economies, mainly to act as a buffer to absorb external shocks and secure regular oper-
ation of the export industries and the public sector. The principal instrument to that end has
been the extension of reserve requirements from the core needs of monetary policy to such an
intermediation of financial savings. The blocking of deposits for these ends started with the
stabilization program of 1960 and was further emphasized by the establishment of a separate
central bank in 1961. It was regulated in the double form of an incremental ratio, for long
being 30, 25 or 20 per cent of total deposits, and an maximum average ratio, starting with 20
per cent and rising to a peak of 28 per cent in 1979, which, being reached, dictated the incre-
mental ratio as well. With rising competition for this financing as against a dwindling deposit
base, the need was felt for a special ajustable blocking of up to 5 per cent in 1981-82, lifting
the total to 33 per cent. On top of that came the commitment of banks to lend 10 per cent of
their deposit increase to investment loan funds. This massive involvement naturally did not
allow of the traditional principles of no interest rate on blocked accounts to be applied, thus
levying a kind of tax on deposit banking for the enforcement of national interest rate policy.
Initially, the principle adopted was one of indemnifying the banks for their deposit interest
expenses plus some markup on top of that, mainly in the range of 2-3 per cent, but falling far
short of making up for the loss of earning credit interest. With the advent first of the index pre-
mium deposits and then formal indexation, corresponding terms were introduced on blocked
deposits from these sources, the indexed accounts from mid-1980 bearing 2 per cent and for
some time 2.5 and 3 per cent, real interest rates. The very large step was taken in March 1987
to unify blocked accounts into one with indexation but without interest rates, thus fulfilling27
the doctrine of no interest rate under a fixed value regime but after a year it was again deemed
necessary to add 2 per cent real interest rate, to be raised in 1993 to 3.5 per cent. So it
remained until May 1998 when, in line with the general trend of deindexation within the bank-
ing system, the terms of blocked accounts shifted again to nominal terms with 5.5 per cent
interest rate. Generally speaking, the path of deposit requirements over the last two decades is
a testimony to the success of the indexation and real interest rate policy. After its real influ-
ence came to be felt the required ratio fell rapidly to the present one of 4 per cent on ordinary
deposits or 2.5 per cent on time deposits and bonds, and, the repurchase of export and produce
loans having been gradually abandoned, the required ratio has regained its purpose for gener-
al monetary management
Real interest rate developments
Guaranteeing the maintainance of full real value of financial obligations through indexa-
tion or other technical means, important as it is, only forms a solid basis on which to build real
growth of financial capital and attain dynamic balance in its allocation among competing uses.
The real interest rate is the main instrument to achieve these ends, whether formally stipulat-
ed as such on top of indexation or resulting from the difference of nominal interest rate over
inflation. As noted above, the previous chapter only distinguishes the coverage of formal
indexation from that of nominal interest rate but does not draw the dividing line between
maintaining full real value or not. Such a dividing line and, thereby, the evaluation of real
interest rates and their contribution to real savings has consequently been reserved for this
chapter. Towards its end, it will be argued that, by force of sheer inertia and its compounding
power, as well as positive incentives for savings, the real interest rate is the most potent fac-
tor of growth of real financial capital. 
The intention here is not to tell the whole story of interest rate policy in Iceland but to treat
it as a parallel to financial indexation and account for the interplay between these two mutu-
ally dependent factors. In the post-war setting of fully administered interest rates, there were
trial runs at the activation of ordinary interest rate prior to general indexation, mainly with the
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stabilization program of 1960 and later in the mid-seventies. The former, in the face of adver-
sities, petered out as an active policy, while the latter shaded over into the indexation policy.
These interactions are best observed with the help of figure 7, showing some fairly standard-
ized types of deposits and credits of the development banks from 1960 to 1996 against the
backdrop of inflation within each year. Over the first years, real rates are moderately negative,
with positive rates emerging in years of particular price stabilization efforts, mainly in 1967
and 1971. From then on and due mainly to a combination of overheating and full wage index-
ation, price developments became explosive while interest rate policy came gradually to be
reactivated, notably with the interest rate premium arrangement from 1976. Even with the
comprehensive indexation system of 1979 and completion of its adjustment period to the end
of 1981, only time deposits, mainly indexed, fully tracked inflation from 1982, but so and still
better, of course, did fully indexed bond credits.
Over the great inflation bulge of 1972-83 the monetary authorities were seeking opportu-
nity to let interest rates catch up with rising or meet falling inflation in order to make up for
the consequent loss of real financial capital and restore the effectiveness of the interest rate as
a tool of demand management for, among other ends, to subdue inflation itself as the root
cause of a host of difficulties. An extraordinary opportunity for this presented itself as a result
of the draconian measures to combat inflation in 1983. For this end it sufficed to moderate
interest rate reductions, and the opportunity was seized to free interest rate determination, first
in two steps in January and August 1984, and then finally in November 1986 after the enact-
ment of liberalizing law on both the commercial banks and the Central Bank. Figure 7 shows
that this resolve was put again to the test in 1985 and also that since 1986 all the rates shown
are well above inflation, rapidly falling to an internationally comparable level from 1992. The
exception from positive real interest rates, though, still consists of pass-book deposits and
then, of course, chequing accounts, the problem of charging payments and such like services
outside the interest rate margins still remaining partly unsolved. This important shift of poli-
cy implemented with the legislation of 1986 signified that the authorities did not trust them-
selves for further discretionary direct determination of interest rates, over and above the
effects of guidance through market operations. To avoid further political manipulation, credit
market participants had to be thrown into cold water to adjust and swim for the shore as best
they could. This entailed considerable hardships in unprecedented high real interest rates
before the market could adjust to more moderate levels and the society at large had learned to
live with it.
For the evaluation of combined effects of indexation and real interest rate policy it is nec-
essary to review developments of domestic credit as a whole. This is done in the form of
weighted average real interest rates for the main branches and total of domestic financial cap-
ital, a result of complicated calculations too long and detailed to be of interest here, also cov-
ering the period 1960-96. Marketable bonds occupy a special position, the Treasury savings
certificates being indexed from the start and bearing a generous 7.2 per cent interest rate, soon
to be lowered to 6 and later 5.1 and even down to 3.2 per cent in 1981. Harsh competition in
a tight market then forced it up to 7 and 8.5 per cent respectively in 1984 and 1986. After that
it moderated to a reasonable level well below bank credit pari passu with flourishing multi-
plicity of bonds of all sectors. The line for bonds in figure 8 is drawn according to the aver-29
age accruals on the dominating Treasury bonds, and the same weighted, due to imperfection
of data for other bonds, into the credit system total. The remaining chief subsectors of bank
credit and investment loan funds often coincide remarkably well, not least in the extremes dic-
tated by inflation, their common denominator. The banks tend to show higher results when
interest rates were reactivated or inflation subdued, whereas loan funds with more indexed
loans first show more even results and from 1979 lead the way of recovery of real rates. With
the opportunity afforded to the banks by the interest rate liberalization of 1984-86 these rela-
tions get turned upside down, reflecting greater risk and actual credit losses in bank opera-
tions. By their weights these two subsectors between them dictate the total average real inter-
est rate of the credit system. 
The period under review can be subdivided with reference to active interest rate policy as
well as resistance to inflation, and thereby to its results in terms of real interest rates. From
these criteria four subperiods can be discerned: 1. Period of inadequate nominal interest rates
and incipient indexation coupled with considerable inflation resistance over the first decade to
1971; 2. Suppressed interest rates and other demand policies with a lapse into a great inflation
bulge and only emerging partial indexation up to the comprehensive legislation of 1979; 3.
Adjustment period of indexation with inadequate real interest rates until the stepwise interest
rate liberalization of 1984-86; and 4. Free market formation of interest rates from 1986, with
or without indexation and under considerable threat of renewed direct intervention, as severe
supply shocks were encountered in some of these years. During this last phase of develop-
ments the nature of indexation changed considerably from a policy measure of administrative
control to a freely available financial market norm. 
The results of these different phases of policy appear clearly in figure 8. Negative real
interest rates of 24.4 per cent in 1974 and 15-16 per cent in 1973 and 1975 was simply hor-
rendous, and almost as strong adjectives could be used about negative outcomes of around and
over 10 per cent in a few more years. Almost as serious was the fact that continuous negative
interest rates over all but four years from 1961 to 1983, or a total of nineteen years, was sap-
ping the strength of the credit system. In its turn, the recovery has been uninterupted since
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1984 with exceptionally high real interest rates, peaking with 9.2 per cent in 1988 and staying
at 8 per cent or above in 1990-93, before receding to more moderate levels below 7 per cent
since 1996. 
Effects of real interest rate developments
Data on real interest accruals on the stock of domestic financial capital lend themselves to
interesting observations of their direct effects in a macroeconomic context as well as on that
stock. Figure 9 shows total real interest accruals as a ratio to GDP. The columns below zero
signify the total of inflation transfers within the economy, sometimes called the inflation tax,
while the positive columns, of course, show the share of real financial earnings. The inflation
loss, or gross depletion of financial stock, reached amazing proportions, of 10.5 per cent of
GDP in 1974, 7 per cent in 1973 and 1975, and some 4-5 per cent in a few years. The total of
all the negative percentages reaches 50 per cent, the total of inflation sacrifice of savers up to
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1983 equalling for once one half of GDP. The consistently positive returns from 1984, with a
ratio between 8 and 9 per cent through 1992-96, on the other hand, totals three fourths of GDP.
In neither case is a year-to-year compounding of real interest rates taken into account. 
An accumulative approach is justified, however, in gauging the effects on the stock of
financial savings. Such a calculation is presented in figure 10 where the average real interest
rate is compounded through the period and compared with the actual development of the real
financial stock. The lower line of accumulated interest alone shows a slow decline by about
one fifth over the period of resistance to 1969-71. This would have been the fate of the origi-
nal stock without further additions. Despite that negative effect, the actual financial stock
about doubled over the same period, the main reasons being both that private hopes for real
returns had not yet been dashed and that public efforts for collective savings were consider-
able. From then on, the depletion was much faster, shedding further three fifths by the com-
pounding process until 1983 with only 21 per cent of the original stock left. The actual real
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stock, however, only declined to 1975 but recovered to 1978-80, for thereafter to enter a phase
of vigorous growth. To this, obviously, contributed a widespread opportunity of gainful sav-
ings and later a general economic upswing. Taking a new departure from 1983, the bottom
year of compounded interest, both series can be depicted as almost straight lines, the com-
pounded one increasing by 133 per cent or 6.7 per cent annually, forming a solid basis for the
considerably faster actual increase by 208 per cent or 9 per cent annually. The relative 32 per
cent increase of actual trend above computed, however, mainly occurs in the period up to
1991, after which interesting variations happen.
A case can be argued for a fundamental difference, of kind rather than degree, between the
yield accruing on resting balances and new financial savings added on top of that. The former
may rest in its place by sheer force of inertia, supported by the comfortable experience of pos-
itive returns, while the latter requires a discretionary action based on willpower and perceived
preferences, in which the rate of interest or return is bound to play some part, along with
income experiences, previous accumulation, users surplus on durables, and what not. This dis-
tinction, at least, seems to call for the search of somewhat different causal factors of each com-
ponent. It should not, however, be overdone as there is reason to believe that it is most impor-
tant in the incipient phase of a strong financial recovery, while there is little prospect for a
point of saturation to be reached for many savers. At that stage and onwards, however, savers
are more likely to view their financial savings as a whole and without consideration of such a
distinction, and still more so when wider opportunities such as that of holding shares or other
direct investment present themselves, such as the case has increasingly been in Iceland of late.
This qualification should, though, not distract from the appreciation of positive returns,
whether to be viewed as an independent compounding effect or a factor in complicated asses-
ment of a multiple set of preferences.
The composition of annual real financial savings along these lines appears in figure 11, in
terms of percentages of total stock of finance at the beginning of each year. Real yield or inter-
est repeats the same percentages as given for total credit in figure 8, while new savings are
calculated as a residual factor. Of course, the use of whole years is somewhat arbitrary as the
distinction could be a little different on a half- or quarter-yearly basis. For most of the period,
up to 1983, the yield curve lies at the bottom and is mostly negative. New savings are then
substantial and most of the years making up for the negative yield, and sometimes well above
that. They relate rather closely to economic growth and its cyclical movements, either simul-
tanously or with a one year lag, as shown by figure 12, relating the ratio of new savings to pre-
vious stock to changes in real national income. With the initiatives provided by indexation and
real interest rates from 1976, albeit limited in scope at first, new savings appear much greater
than explained by growth, although following a similar longer trend. Important changes occur
from 1984, a landmark year of recovery. Both components are from then on generally more
stable and positive, adding up to the total that stayes on top. The low level of new savings from
1988, negative in 1992-93, is compatible with both the economic setback and possible effects
of relative saturation of the need for financial balances after the great buildup of previous
years. The causal relationships appear very complicated, relating both to flow and stock
effects, and do not lend themselves to sweeping theoretical generalizations without closer
study. The fact remains, that unless the stock of financial capital is maintained by protective33
measures akin to indexation and gradually augmented by some minimum yield, great efforts
must be expended to the end of only staying put. 
Financial capital development
The final test to which the indexation and interest rate policy will here be put is that of the
development of the stock of financial capital, both as viewed in real terms or volume growth
and relative to the needs of the growing economy. The series used have mostly been worked
out from 1954 and to 1996 as before, and they distinguish between four main categories of
domstic savings, as well as adding external credit, and also between four borrowing sectors.
Following up on previous analysis it is natural to start with the volume of financial savings,
drawn up on an artihmetic scale in figure 13, despite the long period, for not to distort inter-
nal proportions. A quick glance at it reveals that only two savings categories were important
at the beginning: voluntary savings in banks, in the form of deposits and notes, and other insti-
tutional savings than in pension funds, mainly public savings in the form of earmarked rev-
enue and profits of public financial institutions. The share of pension funds was very small at
first but grew to gradually overshadowing the rest. Other voluntary savings, i.e. outside the
banks, emerged with Treasury savings certificates in the mid-sixties and grew to take third
place at the end.
Relative growth rates of the subsectors and the resulting multiples of the original are best
discussed in the light of a condensed table like the following. Division into sub-periods is here
dictated by the most important watersheds of actual trends, mainly of total financial savings.
The subperiod of 1954-62 is separated from the rest, also in the calculations for the overall
period, to avoid inordinately high incipient growth rates of some categories distorting longer
term growth rates. Shifts in savings patterns show in slow growth of deposits and other insti-
tutional savings but very high and generally rising rates of other free savings (mainly bonds)
and pension funds. These latter two have occupied the best position to enjoy indexation as well
as the higher longer term interest rates.

















Some of the first subperiod growth rates obviously carry little significance as even small
beginnings can show in very high growth such as is the case with pension funds and external
debt and in second period with bond issues in "other free savings". For the same reason some
overall period growth rates and multiples of these components can be untypically high, even
when limited to the shorter period from 1962. The main issue, of course, is the distinction
between saving domestically or having to borrow abroad. The growth rate of domestic savings
started very high but fell fast to near nil over the seven years from 1972 to 1979, in which bank
and "other institutional" savings decreased by more than 2 per cent annually. With the restora-
tion by indexation and market interest rates, domestic savings showed accelerating growth,
through 7.5 to 9.5 per cent in the end period, with the same branches as before relatively stag-
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Financial sources of credit system
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Percentages of financial savings stock
Growth and multiples of real financial capital by periods
Years Deposits Other vol- Voluntary Other Institutional Financial Net Financial
and untary savings Pension institution- savings savings external capital
notes savings total funds al savings total total debt total
Annual
growth:
1954-62 11.1 . 11.2 20.2 4.3 6.2 9.1 14.8 9.9
1962-72 4.6 38.0 6.2 10.1 5.1 6.3 6.3 9.4 6.9
1972-79 -2.2 6.2 -0.6 7.5 -2.3 1.2 0.1 13.0 4.0
1979-85 5.1 -1.3 3.8 16.1 7.6 11.8 7.5 8.7 8.0
1985-96 5.1 16.7 8.2 14.0 3.6 10.6 9.5 2.2 7.0
Overall:
1954-96 4.8 . 6.1 13.4 3.6 7.3 6.7 8.9 7.1
1962-96 3.4 16.7 5.0 11.9 3.5 7.5 6.2 7.6 6.5
Multiples:
1954-96 7.3 . 12.2 196.5 4.5 19.2 15.5 36.5 18.2
1962-96 3.1 193.3 5.2 45.2 3.2 11.8 7.7 12.1 8.535
nant. External debt moved in the opposite direction, largely to counterbalance the variation of
savings, down to a trickle in the last period. Total supply of credit, however, gives a clear indi-
cation of shortage in the middle period, with only 4 per cent annual growth, while the decline
from 8 to 7 per cent credit growth at the end, in a free and open regime, seems rather an indi-
cation of circumspection and economy in the use of capital in response to equilibrium interest
rates. The total achievement of a 15-fold increase of financial stock since 1954 or almost 8-
fold since 1962 is in itself impressive. By comparison, the much greater multiple of external
debt can be regarded as exessive but also partly natural with regard to the opening up of the
economy and, at any rate, seeking balance towards the end.
The description of trends leads naturally to the question of whither they have taken the
composition of the stock of financial capital. This is expressed in figure 14 in percentages of
the stock of financial savings at end of each year and at current prices. Thereby, the great shifts
in the respective roles of different branches of the credit system come out more clearly than
before. Deposits and notes started the period off with 53 per cent of savings and rose to a max-
imum of 62 per cent in 1961. After maintaining a similar position over some years, their share
gradually declined, most rapidly from 1986, to only 25 per cent in 1996. Reluctance for long
to allow banks to index their funds or manage their interest rates as well as the incidence of
monetary targeting proved impediments to their growth, but even more so the modern trend
for securitization that they have met by running own securities branches. This trend is reflect-
ed both in the irregular increase of "other voluntary savings" to 15 per cent in 1976 and final-
ly some 17 per cent in the last years, and still more so in the voluminous increase of pension
funds to 46 per cent of savings in 1996, pari passu with the decline of other and more inter-
ventionist institutional savings from 43 per cent at the beginning to 12.5 at the end. Instead of
the composition of voluntary and institutional being 53 and 47 per cent at the beginning it
ended up with 42 and 58 per cent in 1996.
The other main feature of figure 14 is to show the proportion to which the stock of domes-
tic savings is augmented by external capital at disposal for domestic agents. It starts by less
than 6 per cent to increase soon by leaps and bounds, mainly in connection with external
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schocks, leading both to devaluation and heavy borrowing as well as to appreciation in krónur
terms of previous debt. Preliminary tops were reached with 39 per cent in 1960 and 68 per cent
in 1975 and an all time high of 75-79 per cent in 1982-85, with substantial declines in
between, not the least due to the recovery each time to a higher real exchange rate. Since the
long awaited maturity of the credit market in 1986 there has been a solid decline of foreign
indebtedness to only 34 per cent of savings stock in 1996, or to less than half the top level. It
should be noted, however, that the exchange rate of the króna was utterly unrealistic at the
beginning of the long period, the real rate then about double that of 1996, and also immedi-
ately prior to the big devaluations of 1960, 1967-68 and 1975. When account is taken of this
by calculating at 1996 prices and exchange rate throughout, the first half period to 1975 shows
a much higher and more smoothly moving external share with, however, little difference in the
latter half
Relative developments of savings and credit
The real volume of financial savings need not be a satisfactory yardstick. Much greater
attention in the discussion has been devoted to its development in relation to gross domestic
product, this being a realistic measure of the challenge faced by the domestic credit system.
The same can also be said of the national wealth but, given the relative constancy of its ratio
to GDP, this should boil down to a similar conclusion. This measure indicates a much more
serious setback than that viewed in real volume terms, while the recovery in relation to the
rather slow growth of past decade or so appears no less spectacular. Figure 15 presents a gen-
eral overview of domestic financial savings stock from end of year 1954 to 1996 as a per-
centage ratio to GDP of the same year. This long period falls distinctly into three subperiods
similar to those introduced before. The first up to 1972 was one of resistance to difficult rather
than intolerable inflation and of rather weak monetary management to cope with it. It is char-
acterized by fluctuations around a slightly rising trend while the ratios were still far below that
generally prevailing in other developed countries and utterly insufficient for the needs of
development, as witnessed by the growing dependence on external borrowing. Bank savings
of close to 40 per cent and other institutional savings than in pension funds of some 24-30 per
cent were the mainstay of savings, while the meagre beginnings of pension funds and private
bond investments were important enough to account for a rising trend of the total from some
60 to around 70 per cent of GDP. 
It is a matter of interpretation and emphasis whether the second period is defined to the
trough in 1980 or including the recovery to the previous level up to 1986. The previous ratios
of bank savings and "other institutional" were just about halved to some 21 and 10 per cent in
1979-80, so the total declined by a quarter of GDP to 45 per cent. It took six years to 1986 for
the total to recover to the 1970-72 level, after 14 years of subnormal ratios, indicative of finan-
cial shortages, but then the composition had changed drastically with most of the recovery
accounted for by pension funds alone. This point of recovery, defined only by equality with
previous level, however, carries no causal significance as the same forces of real interest rates
and their incentive effects continue uninterrupted with the buildup of financial stocks and
without any sign of saturation into the nineties. Such signs start to appear in voluntary savings
as from 1993, with decline of the banks savings ratio by two points to 34 per cent in 1996 and,37
private bond investments barely making up for that, the voluntary savings ratio was almost
stagnant over the last four years at 56-57 per cent of GDP. Throughout the recovery, by far the
greatest increase occurred with the pension funds, from 9 per cent in 1980 through 20 in 1986
to 62 in 1996, or by more than a half of GDP over 16 years, the increase having accelerated
substantially with high real interest rates since 1988. Including some increase in the ratio of
other elements, institutional savings increased from 19 per cent in 1980, through 34 in 1986
to 79 in 1996, or by a full 60 per cent of GDP. The total stock of financial savings into the
credit system has then tripled since the trough of 45 per cent in 1980, through the recovery
level of 69 in 1986 to 135 per cent of GDP in 1996. That should be close to parity with many
developed countries, not least when account is taken of that growing purchases of shares by
the public is here not included.
Finally, an overview is given in figure 16 of the sectoral composition of total credit in the
economy, also as a ratio to GDP, but in this case with foreign borrowing included and only
available from 1970. Comparability through time is impaired by a reclassification made from
1980, when public enterprises were moved from the government to the enterprise or industri-
al sector. To a large extent, this side of the matter is a reflection of that of savings with the
main exceptions that, on the one hand, the trough is here largely evened out by foreign bor-
rowing and, on the other, that during the recovery the foreign debt is for some time depreciat-
ed by rising real exchange rate and, towards the end, substituted for by rapidly rising domes-
tic savings. The sectoral composition brings important lessons, on similar lines as from finan-
cial liberalizations abroad, albeit embarassing to some. Originally, the chief purpose of restor-
ing the credit market was thought of as to strengthen the industrial base for a renewal of vig-
orous economic growth. This purpose was fulfilled to the extent of industrial sector credit
attaining 79 per cent of GDP in 1984, up from 43 per cent in 1979, and varying between 59
and 81 per cent from then on. With this basic need catered for, rather unexpectedly, other and
higher level needs and aspirations came to the fore, mainly for housing and infrastructure as
well as other direct needs of households. The strength of households for acquiring loans lay
both in the bidding for their deposits and, in the field of public housing loans, in the political
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bidding for their votes as well as in growing financial strength of their occupational pension
funds. Household debt, starting with 22 per cent of GDP in 1970, sank to 13 per cent in 1980
to grow again rapidly to 72 per cent in 1996, almost as much as enterprises. With growing
accumulation of household debt, to above annual disposable income of households, it has
increasingly been regarded as problematic, mainly by well meaning politicians. That argu-
ment, however, overlooks the facts that the debt accumulates in tandem with a commensurate
increase of assets and that such borrowing is mostly in response to positive opportunities
rather than to negative pressures to maintain consumption in face of real income decline.
Undoubtedly, however, credit could be employed more profitably on the margin by industrial
investment. The public sector, starting with 10 per cent of GDP in 1970 and reclassified to 8
per cent in 1980, from then on increased its stock of debt fast to reach an average of 40 per
cent of GDP in the last two years. Altogether, the credit stock first fell from 89 per cent of
GDP in 1970 to 74 per cent in 1979, to grow again fast to 185 per cent in 1996, still more than
in the case of savings in line with parallels among developed countries.
Credit terms policy in wider socio-economic context
Criticism of indexation and real interest rate policy has not been lacking. It has mainly been
founded on the desire to ligthen the debt burdens for the less well off and young upcoming
people in the beginning phase of asset accumulation as well as for the relatively weak, often
regionally based, industries offering these people a growing base of employment. Obviously,
this touches upon a perennial problem of how to lift the lower socio-economic echelons to the
general level by various measures of incentives or support. Solutions of that are many-faceted
and not limited to providing low cost financial capital, a policy that according to the experi-
ence traced here seems bound to backfire in harsh shortage of that universal good. In greatest
generality, the conclusion is that financial markets in general must not be distorted for such
benign policies, while specifically designed and targeted policy measures to that end ought to
be pursued.
Debate on the less sophisticated public opinion level has been handicapped by limited
understanding of the conceptual complexities involved. The most common conceptual errors
are to treat revaluation of debts for neutral inflation as real cost, to compare revaluation of
financial stock at a point of time with an income or expenditure flow over a year, or to account
for the appreciation of debt without at the same time taking the corresponding appreciation of
assets into account. Assets and debts are meant to last for a number of years and are as a rule,
whether individually or as an aggregate, normally some multiple of annual flows, so their cost
must be spread over their expected lifetime, and the same goes for their appreciations.
Consequently, even modest revaluations can easily overwhelm annual income flows and
appear to crowd out other outlays, if not treated in a proper manner of real concepts.
Furthermore, the power of accumulation by compound interest, as well as the accelerating
process of financial intermediation, dictates a prolonged rise of the ratios of financial stocks
to flows.
The criticism alluded to above was sharpened by two unfortunate incidents of develop-
ments in the nineties. The first sprang forth from the extraordinarily high inflation in1982-3,
coupled with declining real earnings and mismatch between them and the credit terms index.39
This situation, as it was expected to endure, gave occasion for widespread revisions of asset
and debt positions in relation to income, to which naturally some people were less alert than
others. The recent indexation of loans was by many held responsible for financial distress and
an increasing number of bankruptcies. The worst cases, however, were associated with the
rigid practice of real estate dealers not to index house sellers balances in the short to medium
term but to stick to nominal 20 per cent interest rate that proved disastrous to those buying
new housing at rapidly rising prices. Thus, the lack of uniform implementation of the system
seems rather to be blamed. The latter case occurred when the boom peaked in 1987 and gave
way to a serious setback from 1988, thus causing excessive strains in the credit market. Such
a situation could possibly have justified intervention into excessive real interest rates which,
however, would have entailed the risk of starting a chain of events contrary to the liberaliza-
tion policy. In both instances, therefore, the solution of these transitory problems was pre-
ferred of lengthening loans as required in special cases and of financial reorganization of
threatened enterprises.
Initially, in the framework of administered credit terms and against the background of a
strong tradition of incomes policy, indexation could be regarded as an economic policy mea-
sure. With financial liberalization, and especially with the setting free of interest rates as from
1986, its nature and role changed to a free choice among alternative credit terms, with regard
mainly to market perception of inflation risk, while monetary management was being gener-
alized and modernized in terms of market operations. This attitude, however, was slow to
dawn upon the public and political parties, causing repeated clamouring for intervention and
trade union tendencies to pull interest rate determination into the collective bargaining orbit.
Hardly realizing their members overwhelming lifetime interest in financial accumulation, their
leadership almost invariably gave precedence to the more marginal interest of debtors and job
seekers among their members and pressed for generally low real interest rates. Incidentally,
this attitude may have helped indexation pave the way for disinflation that has proceeded suc-
cessfully over the last few years.
At the outset no promise was given that financial indexation would lead to desired disin-
flation, which in view of the contrary effects of wage indexation would have been considered
a daring commitment. The distinction between these two types of indexation hinges mostly on
their respective cost or demand effects. Wage indexation accelerates the rise of costs and
thereby, under accommodative demand policies, pushes inflation along, while the argument is
far fetched that it can restrict demand. Similar cost-push causation can, in a simple-minded
fashion, be brought to bear on financial indexation, while in that case the resulting real inter-
est rates will have a direct demand restraining effect that is liable to be stronger than the cost
effect and can be augmented through fiscal and monetary measures. There are several strands
of this argument for disinflationary effects, relating to forces brought into play by strong inter-
est rate policy after an extended period of free reins. Firstly, and mainly while the position of
trade unions was still strong, the automatic adjustment of debts to the rate of inflation wiped
out the gains from it, real and imaginary, that for long had provoked inflationary settlements.
Even open complaints were aired that the system left no scope for gains through hard bar-
gaining. Secondly, by the same token, responsible settlements were encouraged by the sys-
tematic guarantee that nominal interest rates would be adjusted to yield the targeted real inter-40
est rates rather than staying high for reasons of inflation risk. Thirdly, the elimination of infla-
tion gains and the need to foot the real interest bill alongside that of wages and salaries reim-
posed the discipline so long absent in the business community. Fourth, the demand restraint
created the framework for effective competition to keep down prices and secure gains in liv-
ing standards better than before, with feed-back effects for improved income and price stabil-
ity. Fifth and finally, by these processes was created a level playing field for demand man-
agement policy to fulfil its role. To these real side economic effects can be added the con-
structive influence of fostering a mature capital and money market by building up the stock of
financial capital and multiplying its forms of tradeable objects. 
Possible international parallels 
Publication of this text on an international forum is bound to raise questions as to its pos-
sible wider applicability. Is the experience of Iceland in this respect such a special case that it
contains no lessons for other economies, or are there parallels to which it is applicable? It is
common knowledge that public attitude in other countries to financial indexation is positive-
ly correlated with the changing level of inflation. For the time being the interest for it as a gen-
eral solution is at a low and will hardly be revived unless inflation creeps into the upper reach-
es of the one digit range. In Iceland, it was not introduced as such until double digit inflation
had been problematic for decades, although by retrospect it would have seemed wise to do so
long before. There still remain many countries with inflation in a similar range that might con-
sider the experience of this policy in Iceland. The rationale for resorting to financial indexa-
tion in their cases may, however, depend on a host of particular circumstances, such as by
which forces their inflation is generated, whether the independence and integrity of adminis-
tration and quality of index computation allows of a reliable measure of that kind, or how
appealing alternative foreign exchange denominations may be, not the least for former depen-
dencies with exchange rates linked to single reserve currencies. Relatively independent and
developed countries with, however, inflation maintained by a vicious circle of interactions
between wages and interest rates, may be the likeliest candidates for general financial index-
ation. 
Apart from being employed as a comprehensive solution to the depreciation of inflation
ridden currencies, indexation is increasingly being applied to the sectors of the capital market
most risk averse and sensitive to reliable real interest rates, such as investment by pension
funds and such like in public sector bonds. The best known examples, of course, are the
Anglo-Saxon countries and some of the Nordic countries. Indexed issues, thereby, have an
opportunity of being tested for preference in the market and providing an interesting and
increasingly used opportunity for the assessment of market perception of inflation prospects
and risk of unindexed papers. Despite present tranquility, some risk of inflation revival always
looms on the horizon. An interesting option may, therefore, be to make long term contracts
contingent upon a revision clause, whereby indexation would be set in train at a certain and
not very high level of inflation. 
A similar measure could possibly be devised in the international forum to cope with curr-
ency crises such as have shaken world confidence and created havoc in foreign exchange mar-
kets. Market determination of exchange rates plays dual roles that are often difficult to re-41
concile, the macroeconomic role of balancing current trade in goods and services and estab-
lishing a solid basis for the industrial structure, on the one hand, and the financial one of
stabilizing for exchange rates consistent with confidence and credibility for holding vast sums
of exchange denominated wealth, on the other. Transactions of the latter type can obviously
swamp the former. When confidence starts to falter with self-fulfilling consequences, there is
no way to revise denominations other than to sell the respective currency to the point of over-
shooting far beyond realistic current balance purposes. Keynes´ dictum of the by-product of a
casino is an apt phrase in this respect. Rather than clamour for an utterly unrealistic single
world currency, it may be advisable to establish an arrangement whereby danger signals would
activate a clause of revaluation or redenomination of respective financial balances, a proce-
dure of a similar nature as financial indexation.
Conclusions
The main conclusins of this paper are that an almost comprehensive financial indexation,
followed up by market determined real interest rates, proved highly successful in restoring the
stock of financial savings from the severe depletion wrought by previous inflation and accu-
mulating it to an unprecedented high. Thereby, this policy paved the way for a great variety of
financial market objects and forms of organizations as well as for modern instruments and
methods of monetary policy and control. With general liberalization of credit terms and open-
ing up of the credit system, indexation needed no longer to be administratively dictated but
remains as an option for issuers and negotiating partners in the market. 
In the wider context of economic policy, financial indexation has facilitated active demand
management for economic discipline on all kinds of agents and helped bring about disinfla-
tion and secure a durable fundament for equilibrium policy. With increasing confidence in sta-
bility formal indexation has receded, helped by monetary and supervisory authorities in view
of possible risk involved in mixing the regimes.42
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